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A CRITICALGUIDE TO EX PARTE McCARDLE 
William W. Van Alstyne* 
It is commonplace that the Constitution of the United States re-
stricts democratic government, 1 and that it does so as determined by 
the Supreme Court pursuant to its power of substantive constitutional 
review. 2 Although this power of the Court is nowhere explicitly 
granted in the Constitution3 and often has been questioned in theo-
retical discussions,4 most of us are reconciled to it and even are occa-
sionally grateful that it exists. We doubtless agree that certain limita-
tions should be respected by democratic majorities, whatever our dif-
ferences as to what they should be. 5 Where those limits have been 
set, subject to change only by extraordinary processes of amendment, 
provision for an independent judiciary with the power of constitutional 
review has generally been accepted in this country as both wise and 
prudent. Among its other virtues, an independent judiciary may some-
times furnish an important alternative to the anguish of civil disobe-
dience and the desperation of violence in the adjudication of funda-
mental rights. 
Unquestionably, there have been occasions when opinions of con-
stitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court have been extremely 
unpopular, doubtless even wrong and unjust. Even with respect to 
decisions widely believed to be of this nature, however, the general 
immunity of the Court from expedient means of swift and easy correc-
tion has seemed important to preserve. Hence with rare exception, 6 
* Professor of Law, Duke University. LL.B. 1958, Stanford University. 
1. But see B. RosTOW, Tim SoVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 83-192 (1962). 
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
3. See, e.g., L. HAND, Tlm BILL OF RIGHTS 3-30 (1958). 
4. For a selected bibliography, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. 
Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 45-47. 
5. For a fascinating treatment of this age-old problem, see J. RAWLS, A TlmoR'~ 
OF JUSTICE (1971). 
6. There have been only three amendments to the Constitution adopted in re-
sponse to specific decisions of the Supreme Court. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI, super-
ceding Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); U.S. CoNST. amend. Xlli, 
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we have relied upon new appomtments to the Court as the prmcipal 
means of assurmg its contillumg identification with the felt necessities 
of the times. 7 The dependency of the Court upon the President and 
Congress to make its constitutional mterpretations effective beyond a 
given case has been more commonly exploited, but seldom has it been 
effective ill causmg the Court to reverse a decision at a later date. 
Nor was the impeachment power8 ever mtended to be employed to sub-
ject judges to trial for the "high crime" or "misdemeanor" of disagree-
ing with Congress as to the constitutionality of its acts. In short, only 
the processes of amendment in article V of the Constitution clearly 
provide the means by which constitutional mterpretations by the Su-
preme Court may be specifically overruled. 
Withill the past two decades, however, members of Congress have 
taken repeated recourse ill another approach to controllmg the Court and 
bluntillg its power of constitutional review: the congressional power to 
make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In 
the late 1950's Congress considered a proposal to remove certam mtemal 
security laws from the possibility of Supreme Court invalidation. 0 
Somewhat later, it proposed the immunization of existing legislative 
apportionment arrangements from effective constitutional challenge.10 
About the same time, another resolution attempted to foreclose judicial 
review of anti-obscenity laws on the one hand,11 and religious school 
exercises on the other.12 Fmally, Congress has had before it bills de-
signed to avert review of certam police techniques of crimillal investi-
gation13 and the perpetuation of racial segregation in the public 
schools.14 
To be sure, these bills would not have directly "overruled" the 
Supreme Court or "amended" the Constitution, and no startling dis-
superceding Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); U.S. CoNsT. amend. 
XVI, superceding Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
7. Since article ill establishes no set number, Congress may provide for the ap-
pointment of additional justices at any time, but the idea of political proliferation sel-
dom has been regarded as appropriate. With rare exception, enlargement of the Court 
has merely kept pace with the growth of the country and the establishment of 
additional circuits. For an exhaustive statistical analysis of this development, see 
Blaustein & Mersky, The Statistics on the Supreme Court, in IV THE JuSTICES oF THB 
UNITED STATES SuPREME CoURT 1789-1969, at 3187-3239 (L. Friedman & F. Israel 
ed. 1969). 
8. u.s. CoNST. art. n, § 4 provides: "[A]Il civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 
9. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
10. H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
11. S. 4058, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
12. H.R. 6501, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
13. S. 1194, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
14. H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (busing moratorium bill); H.R. 10614, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also H.R. 1228, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
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covery of such a power in Congress has been claimed. Still, it is ob-
vious that the objective was the same. Specifically, these bills sought 
to deaden the effect of particular Supreme Court decisions and to fore-
stall their possible extension or additional application by enacting cer-
tain "exceptions" to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: 
to stop the Court by an enforced silence. 
The constitutional source for this power is thought to lie in the 
exceptions clause of article ill, which prescribes the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction in the following language: "In all the other cases before 
mentioned [save those few committed to its original jurisdiction], the 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and 
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make."15 As none of the recent attempts to draw upon this 
clause has yet succeeded, it is unsurprising that the exceptions clause is 
not well known. It has received substantial attention in professional 
books and journals,16 however, and as recently as 1968 it was the sub-
ject of unhurried discussion in the Hearings before the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Separation of Powers.17 
The views which have been expressed on the scope and meaning 
of the exceptions clause are by no means unanimous.18 On the other 
15. u.s. CaNST. art. m, § 2 (emphasis added). 
16. See, e.g., R. BERGER, CoNGRESs v. THE SUPREME CoURT (1969); I W. CRoss-
KEY, PoLmCS AND THE CoNSTITUTION 616-19 (1953); C. FAIRMAN, REcONSTRUCI'ION 
AND REUNION 1864-88, Part One, in VI HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 413-601 (P. Freund ed. 1971); J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BE-
GINNINGS TO 1801, in l HISTORY OF THE SuPREME CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
204-50, 282-83, 299-300, 313-19, 330-33, 383-86, 431-49, 729 (P. Freund ed. 1971); 
H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 288-340 
(1953); ill J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
449-56, 648-50 (1833); Forkosch, The Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article 
III and a Person's Constitutional Rights: Can the Latter be Limited by Congressional 
Power Under the Former?, 72 W.VA. L. REV. 238 (1970); Grinnell, Proposed Amend-
ments to the Constitution: A Reply to Former Justice Roberts, 35 A.B.A.J. 648 (1949); 
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise 
in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Lenoir, Congressional Control Over the 
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 5 U. KAN. L. REv. 16 (1956); Merry, 
Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. 
REv. 53 (1962); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960); Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying 
the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949); Strong, Rx for a Nagging 
Constitutional Headache, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 246 (1971); Tweed, Provisions of the 
Constitution Conceming the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 BoSTON U.L. REv. 
1 (1951); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965); 
Comment, Removal of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: A Weapon Against Ob-
scenity?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 291; Comment, Congressional Power Over the Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: A Reappraisal, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 178 
(1967); Note, Limitations on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 20 U. 
PITT. L. REv. 99 (1958). For articles significantly related to this subject, see Dellinger, 
Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a Sword, 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1532 (1972); 
Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605; Warren, New 
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923). 
17. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
18. For a sample of differences, see the various interpretations cited note 95 infra. 
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hand, virtually everything written about this clause has shared in com-
mon at least one important reference other than to the bare language of 
the clause itself: a reference to Ex parte McCardle.19 Though more 
than a century old, McCardle still stands as the leading case regarding 
the extent to which Congress may use the exceptions clause to oust 
the Court of its appellate power even as to the substantive constitu-
tionality of acts of Congress. While McCardle's petition for habeas 
corpus was being reviewed on appeal in the Supreme Court, Congress 
adopted an amendatory act clearly intended to remove the Court's 
jurisdiction to prevent it from examining the constitutionality of the con-
troversial Military Reconstruction Act. The Court unanimously sus-
tained the Repealer Act and at once dismissed the case "for want of 
jurisdiction."20 If Marbury v. Madison21 is justly famous because it 
appeared to settle the primacy of the Supreme Court in interpreting 
the Constitution and resolving all cases within the judicial power of 
the United States, Ex parte McCardle is equally important because it 
appeared to settle the authority of Congress to make exceptions to the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
In addition to its constitutional significance, McCardle also pro-
vides an extraordinary insight into one of the many political crises of 
the First Reconstruction. 22 The first part of this article attempts to 
provide a glimpse of that era as background to the decision and as an 
aid to understanding the full intention of Congress in adopting the 
Repealer Act of 186823 which was construed and applied in McCardle. 
The second part provides a critical review of the Supreme Court's opin-
ion, concluding with the disconcerting suggestion that the Court may 
have erred in associating the Repealer Act with the power of Congress 
to make exception to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: 
whatever exceptions may have existed to that jurisdiction as originally 
conferred directly by article ill, they arose not from enactment of the 
Repealer Act but from other sources not then in controversy before 
the Court. Indeed, there was no exception then applicable to bar the 
Court from deciding McCardle's constitutional claims. Rather than 
drawing upon this observation subsequently to argue that McCardle is 
of very little importance as a matter of technical legalism, however, part 
19. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
20. Id. at 515. 
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
22. Charles Fairman reviews much more of that crisis in his recent excellent 
book than one can find room to remember in a critical guide to a single case. C. F Am-
MAN, supra note 16, at 413-601. See also Kutter, Ex Parte McCardle: Judicial Im-
potency? The Supreme Court and Reconstruction Reconsidered, 72 AM. His. REV. 
835 (1967). 
23. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, cb. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. 
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three attempts to show how the general position of the McCardle Court 
conforms entirely with virtually every other judicial construction pre-
viously and subsequently associated with the exceptions clause, how 
the view that the clause vests a plenary authority in Congress best fits 
the presuppositions of federalism generally animating the original plan 
of the Constitution and the original Judiciary Act of 1789, and how 
that view is nonetheless compatible with the integrity of the judicial 
power and the continuing protection of civil liberties by state and na-
tional courts. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DECISION 
The immediate origins of Ex parte McCardle are bound up in the 
Reconstruction revisions of federal habeas corpus and necessarily re-
quire a brief review of that famous writ in terms of its availability 
in 1867. The writ in its most important form-habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum-is directed to the person having custody of the peti-
tioner, to produce him in court and to answer to allegations that the 
custody in which he is held is without legal justification. 24 So very 
important was it seen to be in the protection of personal liberty that 
its general availability in England had been memorialized by Parlia-
ment in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,25 subsequently referred to 
by Blackstone in his first American edition of his Commentaries as 
"another Magna Carta."26 In 1787, even before consideration and rati-
fication of the Bill of Rights, the privilege of habeas corpus was writ-
ten into article I, section 9, of the Constitution.27 Nevertheless, as late 
as 1867, federal statutes provided for writs of habeas corpus in courts 
of the United States in only three sets of circumstances, and Congress 
otherwise relied upon state courts to make such writs available in other 
circumstances. 28 
The earliest federal provision for habeas corpus was made in sec-
tion 14 of the original Judiciary Act of 1789 which permitted the fed-
eral courts, including the Supreme Court, to issue the writ only on be-
half of prisoners held "in custody, under or by colour of the authority 
of the United States .... "29 Thus, persons held in jail or otherwise 
detained by state or local authority could not secure a speedy determi-
24. SeeR. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 35-37 (2d rev. ed. 1969). 
25. 31 Car. n, c.22. 
26. BLACKSTONE'S CoMMENTARIES *135 (Am. ed. 1832). 
27. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 
28. See Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus In The Supreme Court, 1962 
SUP. Cr. REv. 153. For changes in the statute from 1789 to 1867, see Longsdorf, The 
Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended, 131 F.R.D. 407 (1953). 
29. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, 
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nation of the legality of their detention through federal court peti-
tion.30 In 1833, Congress approved habeas access to federal courts 
for persons confined under the authority of a state, but only insofar as 
such persons were detained "for any act done, or omitted to be done, 
in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or 
decree, of any judge or court thereof . . . ."31 Except for an addi-
tional, modest extension of federal habeas in 1842,32 to protect foreign 
citizens acting under a claim of national authority or international law, 
the doors of the federal courts remained closed to state prisoners. 
The severe disadvantage of this arrangement was most acutely 
felt in the aftermath of the Civil War. State prisoners were unable 
to obtain federal habeas corpus relief even when held in violation of 
the Constitution or federal laws such as the newly ratified thirteenth 
amendment or the Reconstruction statutes providing for equal civil 
rights.33 Finally, on February 5, 1867, the Reconstruction Congress 
expressly confirmed the power of all federal courts and judges to issue 
writs of habeas corpus in any case, state as well as federal, where cus-
tody was challenged on grounds of national law. Specifically, the new 
Act provided that the federal courts had "power to grant writs of ha-
beas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or 
her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law 
of the United States."34 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of lllinois, a Radical Republican who 
drafted this Act as well as several other major pieces of Reconstruction 
legislation, subsequently explained the necessity and purposes of the Act 
in these statements to the Senate: 
The act of 1789 authorized the issuing of all such writs in cases 
where persons were deprived of their liberty under authority or 
color of authority of the United States. Why, then, was the Act of 
1867 passed? It was passed to authorize writs of habeas corpus 
to issue in cases where persons were deprived of their liberty under 
State laws or pretended State laws. It was the object of the act of 
1867 to confer jurisdiction on the United States courts in cases 
not before provided for, and it was to meet a class of cases which 
was arising in the rebel States, where, under pretense of certain 
30. For a brief period in 1801, however, habeas corpus was made more widely 
available. See the Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 2, 2 Stat. 89, as amended, Act of 
March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. 
31. Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634. 
32. Act of August 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539. 
33. Most of these statutes have been carried forward to the present. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1970) (corresponds to Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 
16 Stat. 144); 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq. (1970) (corresponds to Act of May 31, 1870, 
ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 141). 
34. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385. 
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State laws, men made free by the Constitution of the United States 
were virtually being enslaved, and it was also applicable to cases 
in the State of Maryland where, under an apprentice law, freedmen 
were being subjected to a species of bondage. The object was to 
authorize a habeas corpus in those cases to issue from the United 
States courts, and to be taken by appeal to the Supreme Court. 85 
235 
Thus for the first time, general federal court power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus in behalf of persons held in custody under state or local 
authority was firmly established in the federal judiciary, with express 
right of appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Senator Trumbull's reference to that portion of the Act of 1867 
authorizing a right of appeal to the Supreme Court pertained spe-
cifically to the second paragraph of section 1: 
From the final decision of any judge, justice, or court, inferior to 
the circuit court, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court of 
the United States for the district in which said cause is heard, and 
from the judgment of said circuit court to the Supreme Court of 
the United States . • • . 86 
This provision of the Act was thought to be necessary because of a 
shortcoming which had developed as the result of judicial interpretation 
of section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 22 authorized re-
view by the Supreme Court by writ of error from the judgments of 
inferior federal courts in all civil actions and suits in equity only when 
the matter in dispute exceeded the sum of $2,000.87 In 1847, in 
Barry v. Mercein,38 a denial of habeas corpus relief was brought to the 
Court by writ of error. The Court held that while petitions for habeas 
corpus were a form of civil action, no appeal could lie under section 22 
from the judgment of an inferior federal court disposing of a habeas 
application unless the jurisdictional amount was satisfied. 39 The Act 
of 1867 overcame this obstacle by providing a right of direct appeal to 
35. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868). 
36. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 386. 
37. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. 
38. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847). Barry involved a habeas corpus suit in a 
federal circuit court brought by a husband to secure custody of a child from the wife. 
The petition was disallowed by that court and the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme 
Court for lack of jurisdiction under section 22. It should be noted that Barry was 
not dispositive of the question whether a federal habeas petitioner could seek Supreme 
Court review when he was held in federal custody claimed to be unlawful under na-
tional law; petitioner's daughter was not held in federal custody, and lower court juris-
diction had been based solely on diversity of citizenship. 
39. Even prior to 1867, however, appeals could be taken from state court judg-
ments in habeas claims raising federal questions, without regard to any dollar amount 
in controversy, under the same sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as those involved 
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). See Ratner, supra 
note 16, at 193-201. 
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the Court which was no longer dependent on satisfying the jurisdic-
tional amount. 
This statutory enlargement of federal habeas corpus relief was not, 
however, the only important legislation adopted by the Reconstruction 
Congress. In addition to enacting the thirteenth, fourteenth and fif-
teenth amendments, it adopted far-reaching substantive statutes to se-
cure the federal protection of civil rights and civil liberties. Partially 
to enforce those measures, Congress also adopted the Military Recon-
struction Act of March 2, 1867, to "regularize" federal military juris-
diction in the South by dividing the region into districts subject to mili-
tary command. 40 Ironically, it was the clash between the Military Re-
construction Act and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 that was to pro-
duce the crisis of Ex parte McCardle. 
The immediate events leading to the McCardle decision com-
menced on November 12, 1867, when the federal circuit court for the 
district of Mississippi issued a writ of habeas corpus directing Major 
General Ord, the Commander of the Fourth Military District, to de-
liver William H. McCardle to the United States Marshal, pending dis-
position on the merits of McCardle's claim that he was being held in 
military custody in violation of the Constitution. 41 McCardle, editor 
of the Vicksburg Times, had been arrested by Major General Alvin Gil-
lem acting pursuant to the Military Reconstruction Act. At the time 
of his petition, McCardle was held in military custody awaiting trial by 
military commission for four alleged offenses, none of which appeared 
to be military in nature. He was charged with disturbing the peace, in-
citing to insurrection and disorder, libel, and impeding reconstruction, 
solely on the basis of several vituperative, anti-reconstructionist edi-
torials he had authored and published in the Times.42 
40. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. 
41. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 320-21 (1868), setting forth the 
pertinent facts. 
42. On November 6, 1867, McCardle had editorialized in the Times: 
We said a few days since that to be a militarY satrap, in the poor down-
trodden South, was, ex necessitate rei, to be a scoundrel .• , there is not a 
single shade of difference between Schofield, Sickles, Sheridan, Pope, and 
Ord and . . . they are each and all infamous, cowardly, and abandoned 
villains who, instead of wearing shoulder straps and ruling millions of people, 
should have their heads shaved, their ears cropped, their foreheads branded, 
and their persons lodged in a penitentiacy. 
Additionally, McCardle urged whites to boycott an election called to authorize a state 
constitutional convention, offered to pay one dollar for the name of any white known 
to have voted and promised to publish the names in the Times. 
A sample of a later editorial appears in the Congressional Globe of 1868, written 
by McCardle while he was free on bail and awaiting the outcome of his appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The editorial is dated Januacy 21, 1868: 
There is not a man who will pay any tax imposed by this convention 
[the Mississippi state constitutional convention then in session], and if their 
tax collectors undertake to enforce collection, by seizing and selling the 
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On November 25, 1867, the federal circuit court denied Mc-
Carclle's application for habeas corpus, but ordered him released on a 
$1,000 bond pending the outcome of his appeal to the Supreme Court 
pursuant to the appeals section of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. 
Immediately after his appeal had been docketed in the Supreme Court, 
however, a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was filed on 
three grounds by counsel for the government43 (including Senator 
Trumbull). 
First, the government .argued that since McCardle was held in cus-
tody under federal rather than state authority, the circuit court's juris-
diction must have been based upon the Judiciary Act of 1789 rather 
than upon the Act of 1867. Although conceding that the circuit court's 
jurisdiction under the Act of 1789 was proper, the government con-
tended (presumably under Barry v. Mercein) th~:!t no appeal could be 
taken to the Supreme Court under that Act. Nor could an appeal be 
taken on the basis of the 1867 Act. While it was true that the language 
of the 1867 Act extended habeas jurisdiction to "all cases" where cus-
tody was attacked on a constitutional basis and authorized an appeal 
to the Supreme Court from any final decision by the circuit court, the 
government urged that in order to avoid redundancy insofar as federal 
prisoners were concerned and to maintain the limited reconstruction 
purpose of the 1867 Act, it ought to be construed to apply only to per-
sons in state custody. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this 
argument, however, noting that the Act of 1867 was 
of the most comprehensive character. It brings within the Habeas 
Corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible 
case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, 
treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction. 
And it is to this jurisdiction that the system of appeal is ap-
plied.44 
The government's second, more technical argument asserted that 
appeals under the 1867 Act could be taken to the Supreme Court from 
circuit court judgments only when the circuit court had considered a 
habeas case on appeal from a district court, rather than as an exercise 
of the circuit court's original jurisdiction. This position was also re-
jected unanimously by the Court. Finally, the government sought to 
property of the people, they will be shot down like dogs, as they are! 
. . . They know that Ord's convention has no power or authority to tax them, 
and they are determined not to be robbed! The men who attempt it will 
certainly get hurt, for they will be treated as all robbers and highwaymen 
deserve to be treated. 
CoNo. GLOBE 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2061 (1868). 
43. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 320-21 (1868). 
44. Id. at 325-26 (1868) (emphasis added). 
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distinguish the case as one involving a person "charged with [a] mili-
tary offense" which section 2 of the 1867 Act explicitly excepted from 
the section 1 right of appeal. In response, the Supreme Court simply 
observed that it would review that issue once the merits of the cir-
cuit court's decision were under consideration, although it clearly ap-
peared that the argument was bound to fail since McCardle was not 
charged with any offense that could reasonably be called "military" 
in nature. Accordingly, on February 17, 1868, the government's mo-
tion to dismiss was denied. 
As a result of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision upholding 
its jurisdiction in McCardle I, 45 an important anomaly had developed 
under the Reconstruction Congress' powerful contribution to federal 
habeas corpus. The Military Reconstruction Act, intended principally 
to protect Blacks and loyal whites against harassment by southern state 
authority, but drafted in far more comprehensive terms, had become a 
federal sword in the hands of an unreconstructed Mississippi editor. 
Even "worse," the Habeas Corpus Act, intended by its sponsors to es-
tablish habeas appellate jurisdiction principally to enable the Supreme 
Court to review state laws impeding reconstruction and subordinating 
federal rights, was about to be used with the immediate prospect that 
a federal statute deemed vital to reconstruction might be held uncon-
stitutional. This latter issue, after all, was precisely the issue already 
set for argument on the merits in the Supreme Court. McCardle con-
tended that his trial by court martial would violate his fifth and sixth 
amendment rights under the Constitution; that exigent circumstances 
did not warrant the use of martial rule and suspension of the right to 
trial by jury; that application of the Reconstruction Act to his editorials 
would violate the first amendment; and finally, that so much of the Act 
of Congress of March 2, 1867, which placed ten states under military 
jurisdiction was itself unconstitutional!46 In sum, the irony of the sit-
uation in McCardle was that the Habeas Corpus Act, designed to ef-
fecuate reconstruction policies, was about to be used to attack the Mili-
tary Reconstruction Act itself. 47 
45. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868). Hereafter referred to as 
McCardle I. 
46. In light of the fact that Civil War hostilities ended in 1865, and that the civil 
courts were functioning in conformity with the fifth and sixth amendments (albeit not 
necessarily with impartiality), there was considerable reason to suppose that the Su-
preme Court would have decided against the constitutionality of courts martial for 
civilians. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Within 3 weeks of 
the final decision in McCardle II, Chief Justice Chase wrote to a friend: "I may say 
to you that had the merits of the McCardle case been decided the Court would 
doubtless have held that this imprisonment for trial before a military commission was 
illegal." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 494. 
47. See Kutler, supra note 22, at 842. 
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On March 9, 1868, 3 months after McCardle I, oral argu-
ment on the merits of the case was concluded in the Supreme Court 
with Senator Trumbull again participating for the government. Three 
days later, on March 12, a rider was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives, and then it was inconspicuously tacked onto an uncontro-
versial tax appeals bill which had already passed the Senate. Without 
any special note being taken of the rider, the bill as amended was 
adopted virtually without debate. Late on the same day, the amended 
bill was passed by the Senate. 48 Section 2 provided: 
And be it further enacted, That so much of the act approved Feb-
ruary [5, 1867], entitled "An act to amend 'An act to establish 
the judicial courts of the United States,' approved September 
[24, 1789]," as authorizes an appeal from the judgment of the cir-
cuit court to the Supreme Court of the United States, or the exer-
cise of any such jurisdiction by said Supreme Court on appeals 
which have been or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is, 
hereby repealed.49 
This amendment was added, of course, to strike at McCardle's pending 
case. As stated by Representative James Wilson of Iowa when called 
upon to explain his objective in having introduced the Repealer Act, 
his amendment had been aimed at "striking at a branch of the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court of the United States . . . thereby sweep-
ing the [McCardle] case from the docket by taking away the juris-
diction of the court . . . [to] prevent the threatened calamity falling 
upon the country."50 The calamity which Wilson feared was, in his 
own words, "that the McCardle case was to be made use of to enable 
a majority of that Court to determine the invalidity and unconstitu-
tionality of the reconstruction laws of Congress."51 
Nonetheless, the effort did not succeed without resistance. On 
March 25, the Bill was returned to both Houses with a strongly worded 
veto message by President Johnson. The message is not without its 
own interest since Johnson's impeachment trial formally commenced 
only 5 days later, pursuant to articles of impeachment which had al-
ready been reported against him. Thus, as he penned his veto, Johnson 
was aware that he was about to be tried by the very body whose legis-
lation he again had presumed to condemn. He stated in part: 
I cannot give my assent to a measure which proposes to de-
prive any person restrained of his or her liberty in violation of 
the Constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States, from the 
48. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 465. 
49. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. 
50. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess, 2062 (1868). 
51. Id. 
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right of appeal to the highest judicial authority known to our gov-
ernment. To secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity is one of the declared objects of the Federal Constitution. 
To assure these guarantees are provided in the same instrument, as 
well against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' as against the 
suspension of the 'privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,' unless 
when, in cases of 'rebellion or invasion, the public safety may 
require it.' It was doubtless to afford the people the means of 
protecting and enforcing these inestimable privileges that the juris-
diction which this bill proposes to take away was conferred upon 
the Supreme Court of the nation. The act conferring that jurisdic-
tion was approved on the 5th of February, 1867, with a full knowl-
edge of the motives that prompted its passage, and because it was 
believed to be necessary and right. Nothing has since occurred 
to disprove the wisdom and justness of the measures; and to modify 
it as now proposed would be to lessen the protection of the citizen 
from the exercise of arbitrary power and to weaken the safeguards 
of life and liberty, which can never be made too secure against 
illegal encroachments. 
The legislation proposed in the second section, it seems to 
me, is not in harmony with the spirit and intention of the Consti-
tution. It cannot fail to affect most injuriously the just equipoise 
of our system of government; for it establishes a precedent which, 
if followed, may eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary 
and unconstitutional legislation. Thus far during the existence of 
the Government the Supreme Court of the United States has been 
viewed by the people as the true expounder of their Constitution, 
and in the most violent party conflicts its judgments and decrees 
have always been sought and deferred to with confidence and re-
spect. In public estimation it combines judicial wisdom and im-
partiality in a greater degree than any other authority known to 
the Constitution; and any act which may be construed into or mis-
taken for an attempt to prevent or evade its decisions on a ques-
tion which affects the liberty of the citizens and agitates the coun-
try cannot fail to be attended with unpropitious consequences.ll2 
The veto was predictably overridden in the Senate on March 26 and in 
the House on March 27. The brief discussion in both Houses fully 
confirmed the President's specifications of the amendment's design: to 
deny to the Supreme Court authority to exercise its power of substan-
tive constitutional review. The Repealer Act was intended to prevent 
the Court from determining whether McCardle was being held in mili-
tary custody in violation of the Bill of Rights and to preclude the 
52. Id. at 2165. 
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possibility that the Military Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, 
imposing martial rule, would be declared unconstitutional. 53 Immedi-
ately following its passage by the requisite majorities in both Houses, the 
Repealer Act was filed in the Supreme Court. A decision as to the 
effect of the Act on McCardle's then-pending case was postponed and 
the Court called for new arguments on the jurisdictional issue. 
The chronology of events thus associated with McCardle's claim 
on the merits in the United States Supreme Court was this: 
February 5, 1867: Act of Congress expands habeas juris-
diction of inferior federal courts with 
right of appeal to Supreme Court. 
March 2, 1867: Reconstruction Act of Congress estab-
lishes military districts, and provides 
for military jurisdiction in a 1 0-state 
53. I d. at 2062-2120, including the following remarks: 
Senator Doolittle. rnhe honorable Senator from illinois [Trumbull, who 
had just spoken and who had described the repealer bill as "of very little 
importance"] is altogether mistaken in the view which he now presents. . . . 
The honorable Senator himself, as counsel in that court, if I am correctly 
informed, with other counsel made a motion to dismiss a case pending in 
the Supreme Court, or alleged to be pending under this act, and the court 
refused to dismiss it. . . . We all know, the whole world knows, that this 
case of McCardle is pending in the Supreme Court, brought up on appeal, 
under the act of 1867, from the circuit court of Mississippi, and that that 
case has been argued by eminent counsel, and that it is pending. 
Senator Hendricks. rnhe Senator from Nevada [Stewart] was compelled to 
admit that the court was not crowded; and when I asked him the question 
how many cases of this sort and under this law had come into that court he 
could name but one-the McCardle case. . . . Will senators be good enough 
to recollect of a single instance in the history of any free Government where, 
for proper purposes, the jurisdiction of an appellate court has been taken 
away from a cause after that jurisdiction had attached? • . . 
But it is done here; and why? It is to reach the McCardle case. . . . 
[W]hy should he not be heard in that court? Had not the Supreme Court 
of the United States, with great unanimity, decided that a military commis-
sion could not try a citizen in a time of peace for an ordinary civil offense 
that the Constitution had guaranteed to that citizen a trial before a jury with 
full opportunity for defense? . . . • For what purpose has the Supreme Court 
of the United States been established? • . . . Does not the Constitution 
contemplate that all legislation shall undergo the test of the Supreme Court 
of the United States? Marshall thought so; Taney thought so. I cite the 
lights of the law. Marshall, probably the greatest jurist our country has 
produced, freely discussed all constitutional questions, and contributed more 
to establish the meaning and proper construction of the Constitution than 
any other man of the country. . . . 
Senator Johnson (Maryland): Congress has been passing acts of legislation 
which were supposed to be questionable; the power to pass them doubted. 
The President of the United States sought to prevent them by messages con-
taining an argument to demonstrate the want of authority to pass them. 
Congress passed the act of February 5, 1867, and under that act a case finds 
its way into the Supreme Court, was argued several days or a week or more 
prior to the 11th of March, 1868, and rumor had it that it was to be decided. 
The court had no authority to decide it except by virtue of that act; and the 
bill repealing it, without original explanation of its purpose, was passed by 
both Houses in two days. Will not the historian say that those who were 
engaged in such legislation either knew or apprehended that the highest court 
in the land would or might hold the laws to be unconstitutional? 
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area, authorizing trial by military com-
mission. 
November 2, 1867: United States circuit court issues writ 
to produce McCardle challenging mili-
tary authority to arrest and to try him 
for state offenses without trial by jury. 
Validity of Military Reconstruction Act 
is also drawn into question. 
November 25, 1867: Circuit court denies McCardle's appli-
cation for habeas relief, but orders him 
released on $1,000 bail pending out-
come of appeal to Supreme Court. 
February 17, 1868: Motion to dismiss appeal in Supreme 
Court for want of jurisdiction is unani-
mously denied, and the case is set for 
consideration on the merits-M cCardle 
I. 
March 9, 1868: Argument on the merits of McCardle's 
appeal is concluded in the Supreme 
Court. 
March 12, 1868: Act is adopted by both Houses to re-
peal that portion of 1867 Act under 
which McCardle's case had been heard 
in Supreme Court. 
March 25, 1868: President Johnson returns the Repealer 
Act to both Houses with message of 
veto. 
March 27, 1868: Veto is overridden in the Senate and 
House. 
April12, 1869: Following delayed argument in Sup-
reme Court on the effect of the Repeal-
er Act on the Court's jurisdiction to 
decide McCardle's appeal on the mer-
its, the Supreme Court announces its 
unanimous decision-McCardle II. 
The unanimous decision of the Court in McCardle 1154 on April 12, 
1869, was virtually anticlimactic. Terse and dryly matter-of-fact, Chief 
Justice Chase's opinion for the Court contrasted greatly with the style 
Chief Justice John Marshall had employed in Marbury v. Madison,r.;r.; 
54. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
55. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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which Ex parte McCardle is thought to affect so importantly. Where 
Marshall raised, and resolved by dicta, virtually every claim pressed by 
Marbury, Chase carefully avoided any equivalent discussion of the 
many claims raised by McCardle. Even the issue which has identified 
the historical significance of the case-the power of Congress over the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court-was treated without rhe-
torical flourishes as a rather straightforward and perfectly well-settled 
proposition. Indeed, finding support for its position in another opinion 
by Marshall, the Chase Court recorded its ratio decidendi in the follow-
ing few paragraphs: 
It is quite true, • • • that the appellate jurisdiction of this 
court is not derived from Acts of Congress. It is, strictly speaking, 
conferred by the Constitution. But it is conferred 'with such ex-
ceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.' 
. . . . 
... In the case of Durousseau v. The United States [6 Cranch, 
312; Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dallas, 321], particularly, the whole 
matter was carefully examined [by Chief Justice Marshall] and the 
court held, that while 'the appellate powers of this court are not 
given by the judicial act, but are given by the Constitution;' they 
are, nevertheless, 'limited and regulated by that act, and by such 
other acts as have been passed on the subject.' The court said, 
further, that the judicial act was an exercise of the power given 
by the Constitution to Congress 'of making exceptions to the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.' 'They have described af-
firmatively,' said the court, 'its jurisdiction, and this affirmative 
description has been understood to imply a negation of the exercise 
of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.' 
The exception to appellate jurisdiction in the case before us, 
however, is not an inference from the affirmation of other appellate 
jurisdiction. It is made in terms. The provision of the act of 
1867, affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this court in cases of 
habeas corpus is expressly repealed. It is hardly possible to imag-
ine a plainer instance of positive exception. 
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the Legis-
lature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitu-
tion; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction 
of this court is given by express words. 
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case 
before us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the 
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is the power 
to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 
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remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing 
the cause .... 
It is quite clear, therefore, that this court cannot proceed to 
pronounce judgment in this case, for it has no longer jurisidiction 
of the appeal; and judicial duty is not less fitly performed by de-
clining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which 
the Constitution and the laws confer. 56 
So the case came to an end. In its denouement, Ex parte Mc-
Cardle had two character traits shared with Marbury v. Madison, 
apart from the additional coincidence that it derived its basic reason-
ing from an opinion by John Marshall. First, the immediate, substan-
tive constitutional issues which generated great political interest in the 
case at the time were altogether avoided, even more completely than 
in Marbury. Second, whereas Marbury would be read to declare that 
"while we are under a Constitution, the Constitution is what the judges 
say it is,"57 Ex parte McCardle appeared to lay down a very sobering 
afterthought: Congress may prevent the Supreme Court from saying 
anything at all, at least where its appellate jurisdiction is concerned. 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE McCardle OPINION 
Criticism of Ex parte McCardle has not been in short supply. At 
the level of judicial policy, it has been suggested that the Supreme 
Court either should have disregarded the 1868 Repealer Act altogether 
(having already determined its jurisdiction to proceed in McCardle 1), 
or should have held the Act inapplicable to McCardle's case since it 
became effective only after argument had already been heard on the 
merits. Had the Court proceeded according to either of these alterna-
tives, it would have avoided inflicting upon itself the fateful holding of 
its jurisdictional subordination to the will of Congress. Indeed, it 
would have avoided the necessity of confronting two difficult and 
highly charged issues of constitutional significance: whether applica-
bility of the Repealer Act to a case already sub judice violated the con-
stitutional imperative of separated powers;58 and whether operation of 
56. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-15 (1869). 
57. Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, ADDRESSES AND 
PAPERS 133, 139 (1908). 
58. Compare the statement by Mr. Justice Harlan in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 
370 U.S. 530, 567 (1962), that "Congress has consistently with [article lli] with-
drawn the jurisdiction of this Court to proceed with a case then sub judice, Ex parte 
McCardle .••• ", with Mr. Justice Douglas' view that "[t]here is a serious question 
whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today." ld. at 605, n.ll 
(dissenting opinion). From the context in which it was offered, Mr. Justice Douglas' 
caveat was possibly limited to the issue of removing jurisdiction over a case already 
sub judice. On the broader issue, he bas said: "[a]s respects our appellate jurisdic· 
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the Act to frustrate national substantive constitutional review was not 
among the kinds of "exceptions" Congress is permitted to make to the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to article ill. In 
keeping with well-supported canons of judicial construction, the avoid-
ance of such highly sensitive issues as these might itself have provided 
an additional justification for the Court to limit the effect of the Re-
pealer Act short of McCardle's case. 
Against this suggested recourse, however, is first of all the very 
emphatic language of the Repealer Act itself (" ... appeals which have 
been, or may hereafter be taken") 59 and a legislative record unmistak-
ably attaching the Act specifically to McCardle's then-pending appeal. 
Second, there is the fact that the Court had neither reached a decision 
on the merits of the case, nor even considered the case in conference, 
as of the time the Repealer Act became law. In conference, on March 
21, 1868, the Court decided to postpone consideration of Ex parte 
McCardle, notwithstanding opposition by Justices Grier and Field.60 
This decision almost certainly removed the substantiality of the issue 
that holding the Repealer Act applicable to the yet-undecided case 
would trespass upon the judicial power respecting the finality of judg-
ments. Chief Justice Chase's subsequent perfunctory discussion of the 
sub judice issue in McCardle II appears to have been quite correct, 
given the fact that the case had not come to decision by the date the Act 
became effective. Similarly, had the Court moved quickly to decide 
the case (as it could have between March 9 when argument was con-
cluded and March 27 when the Act became law), it would then have 
been thrown into confrontation with the very substantial questions pre-
sented by the merits: the unconstitutionality of the Military Reconstruc-
tion Act in light of Ex parte Milligan61 and the first, fifth and sixth 
amendments. Thus, avoidance of highly sensitive federal questions was 
scarcely a compelling reason either to have hurried the decision or to have 
given the Act a willfully tortured construction in order to deny its in-
tended application to McCardle's case. 62 
A more telling line of criticism, however, has suggested that even 
conceding the applicability of the Repealer Act to McCardle's appeal in-
sofar as jurisdiction was based solely on the repealed portion of the 
1867 Habeas Corpus Act, the Supreme Court could readily have con-
tion, Congress may largely fashion it as Congress desires by reason of the express 
provisions of § 2, Art. ill. See Ex parte McCardle •••• " Flast v. Cohen, 392 
u.s. 83, 109 (1968). 
59. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (emphasis added). 
60. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 467. 
61. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
62. See also Kutler, supra note 22. 
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sidered the case under another unrepealed source of appellate jurisdic-
tion-as the Court itself perfectly well knew. Dismissal "for want of 
jurisdiction" was therefore an unworthy evasion of its constitutional ob-
ligation and insensitive to McCardle's personal predicament as a federal 
prisoner. Specifically, section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 contin-
ued to provide that "all the, before-mentioned courts of the United 
States [including the Supreme Court], shall have power to issue writs 
of . . . habeas corpus."63 As early as 1795, moreover, the Supreme 
Court had permitted this section to be used by persons held "under or 
by colour of the authority of the United States," independent of section 
22 of the same Act which generally confined an appeal in civil actions 
arising in the inferior federal courts to cases involving more than 
$2,000. Section 14 cases fell within the "appellate jurisdiction" of the 
Supreme Court because they called upon the Court to revise a judg-
ment of an inferior tribunal;64 but since they arose in the Supreme 
Court on petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, they did not 
involve the particular form of an "appeal" to which the limitations of 
section 22 applied. 65 
Had McCardle's counsel brought the case to the Supreme Court by 
this means, instead of (or merely in addition to) utilizing the broader 
provision of the newly-minted appeals section of the 1867 Act, pre-
sumably McCardle would have been entitled to a decision on the 
merits. In fact, less than 1 year later another unreconstructed Mis-
sissippi newspaper editor in identical circumstances of military cus-
tody66 invoked this very means of access to the Supreme Court to raise 
many of the issues involved in McCardle. Without the least hesita-
tion, the Supreme Court unanimously sustained its jurisdiction and 
proceeded to the merits. 67 
As strange as this alternative may seem in light of the congres-
sional discussion which rather clearly assumed that jurisdiction in Mc-
Cardle's case depended solely on the 1867 Act, it was apparent to the 
Justices even at the moment they dismissed McCardle's case for "want 
of jurisdiction." Their unanimous opinion in McCardle I just the year 
before reviewed this use of habeas corpus as a confirmed mode of ap-
63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82. 
64. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). But see Paschal, supra 
note 16. 
65. See, e.g., In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852); Ex parte Burford, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 
(1795). 
66. Except that the substantive charge was murder, rather than varieties of sedi-
tious libel. 
67. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wail.) 85 (1869). Once again, however, the 
case was mooted when the government arranged to transfer custody of Yerger to state 
civil authority. 
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pellate jurisdiction. 68 Furthermore, the final paragraph in McCardle 
II again adverted to this alternative procedure, more or less anticipating 
the holding in Ex parte Yerger: 
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the re-
pealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the 
court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an error. 
The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases 
but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does 
not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised. 69 
Given this consideration, should not the Court have proceeded to 
reach the merits, acknowledging that the technical basis on which ap-
peal had been perfected from the circuit court had been withdrawn by 
Congress, but declining to reject the case in view of the existing alter-
native basis for retaining jurisdiction as confirmed by section 14 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789? In favor of this result it might be observed that 
the Supreme Court has generally not been overly technical in holding 
parties to the particular source of appellate jurisdiction they have in-
voked. 70 Surely it was understandable that McCardle's counsel had not 
thought to invoke the more obscure procedure when he first filed under 
the then-apposite provision of ihe 1867 Act. The Court could not 
suppose that there had been sufficient oversight by counsel to prejudice 
his client's standing. And while an "appeal" might ordinarily provide 
a wider scope of review than a habeas proceeding in the Supreme 
Court, that would not be true where, as here, the appeal was itself from 
a habeas proceeding. The claims which McCardle had raised were en-
tirely questions of law which went directly to the jurisdiction of a mili-
tary commission to try him on the stated charges. Thus, the case was 
well within the scope of section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Fi-
nally, John Marshall had presumably indicated what the Court should 
do in such circumstances when he observed nearly a half-century ear-
lier: ''We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the 
other would be treason to the constitution."71 
Given these several considerations, perhaps the Court might have 
proceeded to reach a decision on the merits of the case despite the 
Repealer Act, and arguably it should have done so notwithstanding the 
possible reaction in Congress. Yet the reasonableness of that recourse, 
like the reasonableness of the position of Justices Grier and Field who 
68. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 324. 
69. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515 (citation omitted, emphasis added). 
70. Even today, parties mistakenly taking an "appeal" are frequently treated as 
though they had petitioned for "certiorari." See 28 U.S.C. § 2103 (1970). 
71. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
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had urged the Court to decide the case even before the Repealer Act 
became effective, scarcely demonstrates that the course the Court chose 
instead to pursue was unprincipled. As the Court knew, McCardle 
was in no personal jeopardy at the moment. Indeed, following his re-
lease on bail by the circuit court, he had again been writing flaming 
editorials for the Vicksburg Times. In addition, the Court was aware 
of other congressional action which had been taken in mistrust of the 
judiciary.72 There was good reason, therefore, not to alienate Congress 
further. Self-interest quite aside, the Court was also aware of the con-
gressional belief that a decision invalidating the Military Reconstruction 
Act would be a devastating blow to the capacity of the country to secure 
the protection of Blacks and loyalists in the South in the aftermath of 
bloody Civil War. Furthermore, since the effect of the 1867 Habeas 
Corpus Act and of the Repealer Act on section 14 of the Judiciary Act 
had not been specifically addressed in the several McCardle arguments, 
it is hardly surprising that the Court declined to reach out in what 
might have seemed to be a gratuitous fashion to hold onto the Mc-
Cardle case. As it was, the final paragraph of the opinion suggested 
that only delay in decision was involved, and not self-abnegation of 
the power to decide. 
There was, as a consequence, nothing clearly subject to censure 
in the decision of the Court not to proceed on the merits pursuant to 
the alternative source of appellate jurisdiction provided by section 14 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Nor, as we have seen, was the Court 
necessarily wrong in granting full effect to the Repealer Act as applied 
to a case as yet undecided on the date when the Act became law. 
Were these the only features of the Court's reaction to the political and 
judicial circumstances of 1868, it is surely doubtful whether Ex parte 
McCardle would ever have come under intense criticism as a precedent 
in American constitutional law. 
Rather, what has made Ex parte McCardle so much the sword of 
damocles is its ratio decidendi in respect to the basis and scope of con-
gressional authority to adopt the Repealer Act and to "make exceptions" 
to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The truly signifi-
cant part of the case seems to be tightly packed into the following few 
lines: 
72. Congress had already reduced the Supreme Court from ten to seven members. 
Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209. Compare 3 C. WARREN, THE Su-
PREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTORY 144-45 (1923), with S. KUTLBR, JUDICIAL 
POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION PoLmCS 59-60 (1968). In addition, a bill which had 
already cleared the House proposed to require an extraordinary majority vote of the 
Justices to invalidate an act of Congress. H.R. 379, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868). 
See 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME CoURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 188-93 (1923). 
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The exception to appellate jurisdiction in the case before us • . • 
is not an inference from the affirmation of other appellate juris-
diction. It is made in terms. . . . It is hardly possible to imag-
ine a plainer instance of positive exception. 
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case 
before us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the 
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power 
to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dis-
missing the cause. 73 
249 
As to this, however, possibly an important objection can be of-
fered: not merely that the Repealer Act was not an exception "made in 
terms" or an instance of "positive exception," but that in fact it made 
no exception and possibly is not even correctly identified to the proper 
constitutional clause. The objection to be examined is intended to be 
different from several qualifying observations which have been made 
along similar lines in other treatments of Ex parte McCardle, how-
ever, and correspondingly to be more muted in its ultimate effect. At 
the same time, it may suggest an actual error was committed in the 
McCardle Court's formulation of its ratio decidendi. 
It has elsewhere been pointed out that the McCardle decision, 
taken in context, did not in fact oust the Court from the power to per-
form any of its "essential" or "minimum" functions under Marbury v. 
Madison, Fletcher v. Peck, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, or Cohens v. Vir-
ginia:74 that is, to adjudicate the substantive constitutionality of Acts 
of Congress (or of the several states) in all cases or controversies where 
that question had been appropriately raised and pressed through what-
ever courts the litigants might first have had to pursue, and to estab-
lish a uniform construction for federal laws (including treaties) simi-
larly drawn into controversy. It did not do so because, as anticipated 
by dicta in the case itself and as subsequently confirmed in the holding 
of Ex parte Yerger, there remained available an alternative recourse 
by means of which the substantive constitutionality of the controverted 
Act of Congress, the Military Reconstruction Act, could be brought 
within the Supreme Court's power of constitutional review. McCardle, 
in short, upheld only an inessential exception to the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction, and did not curtail any of its important authority. 75 
73. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513-14. 
74. Respectively at 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 
(1810); 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); 19 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
15. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 16; B. ScHWAR1Z, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 15-20 
(1972); Forkosch, supra note 16; Ratner, supra note 16; Note, supra note 16. 
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But respectfully, even this technical revisionism of McCardle may 
concede too much in one respect and tends, in a different respect, to 
generate a number of very serious questions which would appear to be 
virtually intractable under the broad language of the "exceptions" 
clause. (For instance, what is to be the basis for declaring that some 
exceptions are legitimate because they are relatively unimportant, and 
how can one's preference be reconciled with the unqualified provision 
in article ffi? Why, especially if the point were felt to be important, did 
the McCardle Court itself make no mention of any such limiting 
principle and, indeed, why to the contrary did the Court speak as 
though there were no such distinction?) A different point may be of-
fered, however, by suggesting that it was simply incorrect to say, as 
the Court did say in McCardle, that Congress, by repeal of the appeals 
section of the 1867 Act, thereby made at least some exception to the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, at least for some cases 
arising under at least one federal law. It did not do so because no 
case arising under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 (or any other Act) 
was, by force of the Repealer Act of 1868, placed beyond the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
What was involved in McCardle was merely the congressional re-
consideration and repeal of a special statutory right of access which 
had previously granted to a certain class of litigants a guaranteed 
"appeal" to the Supreme Court. Wholly unaffected by rescission of 
that statutory provision per se, however, was the judicial power con-
ferred upon the Court by force of article m itself or as confirmed by 
several acts of Congress. Correspondingly, whatever diminution or "ex-
ception" might exist with respect to the Court's article m appellate 
jurisdiction, it would result only from the negative implications from 
other Acts of Congress as previously construed by the Court (as in 
Barry v. Mercein), and not by any provision of the Repealer Act it-
self. And as the Court declined to consider its jurisdiction under any 
statute save only that which had been withdrawn, it had no occasion 
whatever to discuss the character and scope of Congress' power to 
"make exceptions." That power was simply not involved in McCardle's 
case. 
All that the Repealer Act did was to repeal "so much of the act 
approved February 5, 1867 .... as authorized an appeal."76 Not-
withstanding the design of Congress to have accomplished more than 
this, nothing more was done. That it did nothing more, and specifi-
cally that it made no "exception" from the appellate jurisdiction of the 
76. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. 
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Supreme Court of cases arising under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 
is conclusively evidenced by the unanimous holding in Ex parte Yerger 
1 year later:-a case which arose under the same Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867 and which was unanimously held to come readily within the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court subject only to limitations 
provided by sections 14 and 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: that ap-
pellate jurisdiction could not be exercised by entertaining an "appeal" 
in a civil case not involving more than $2,000, but that it could be 
exercised through issuance of an original writ of habeas corpus. 77 
Indeed, for the Repealer Act of 1868 to reflect a claim of congres-
sional authority to make "exception" to the Supreme Court's article 
ill appellate jurisdiction to review cases arising under the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867, it would have had to be framed in much differ-
ent terms, such as: 
Or: 
No case arising under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 shall 
be subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
A final decision of a circuit court in cases arising under the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 shall not be subject to review 
in any other court. 
But, of course, it did neither of these and, in light of Yerger, it cannot 
be pretended to have done so even by implication. To be sure, the 
Repealer Act was not trivial legislation and it did effectively strip a 
certain class of parties of an important statutory right they formerly 
enjoyed under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: a statutory right to 
be heard on full and direct appeal from an adverse decision by a fed-
eral circuit court in respect to the lawfulness of custody in which they 
might be held by state or federal officials in alleged violation of the Con-
stitution. Nevertheless, extinguishment of that procedural right left no 
gap in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the exercise 
of judicial power either regarding its power to entertain all such cases 
77. This point was well expressed in Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 
(1869): 
These words [of the Repealer Act] are not of doubtful interpretation • . . . 
They reach no Act except the Act of 1867. 
It has been suggested, however, that the Act of 1789, so far as it pro-
vided for the issuing of writs of habeas corpus by this court, was already re-
pealed by the Act of 1867. We have already observed that there are no re-
pealing words in the Act of 1867. If it repealed the Act of 1789, it did so by 
implication . • . • 
Repeals by implication are not favored • . . . [T]he provision of a new 
and more convenient mode of its exercise [of appellate jurisdiction] does 
not necessarily take away the old; and that this effect was not intended is 
indicated by the fact that the authority conferred by the new Act is ex-
pressly declared to be 'in addition' to the authority conferred by the former 
Acts. Addition is not substitution. 
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originally arising under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 or, indeed, 
regarding its power to determine any issue of law appropriately framed 
in such cases. All of this is implicit in the Court's saving reference 
in McCardle to the power of review preserved by section 14 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, and explicit in its very next holding, in Ex parte 
Yerger, that as the appeals section of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 
was an addition to rather than a displacement of that section, its repeal 
left that section intact as a confirmation and regulation of the Court's 
appellate jurisdiction. Plainly, of course, the Repealer Act of 1868 
had no effect at all on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
concerning any cases other than those arising under the Act of 1867, 
and thus, as it established no "exception" of these, it established no ex-
ception at all. 
This held true, incidentally, even as applied to persons originally 
held in custody under state, rather than federal, authority who, having 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal circuit court as pro-
vided by the first section of the 1867 Act, were unsuccessful and who 
were then remanded to the custody of state officials. To be sure, 
until 1867 such persons could not get into federal courts, because sec-
tion 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was deemed to limit federal court 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus to those in custody "under the 
authority of the United States." But as the 1867 Act gave them access 
to the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court was to hold that the 
"custody'' in which they would subsequently be held would necessarily 
be "under the authority of the United States" as defined by section 14 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 insofar as the immediate "authority" for 
that custody would necessarily be an order by a federal court, even if 
the "order" was merely one remanding them to state custody. The 
impression is confirmed again by dicta in Yerger: 
We are obliged to hold, therefore, that in all cases where a 
Circuit Court of the United States has, in the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction, caused a prisoner to be brought before it, and has, 
after inquiring into the cause of detention, remanded him to the 
custody from which he was taken, this court, in the exercise of its 
appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of habeas corpus, aided 
by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision of the Circuit Court, 
and if it be found unwarranted by law, relieve the prisoner from 
the unlawful restraint to which he has been remanded. 78 
Thus, repeal in 1868 of the appeals section of 1867 not only made no 
exception to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction concerning cases 
arising under the unaffected portion of the 1867 Act dealing with per-
78. ld. at 103 (emphasis added). 
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sons originally held in federal custody (such as McCardle); it did not 
even establish an exception-by-implication with respect to persons or-
iginally held in state custody. 
At the very most, the operative effect of the Repealer Act of 1868 
was solely to limit the scope of Supreme Court review in cases formerly 
entitled to be heard on direct and full appeal. By extinguishing the 
litigant's procedural right of "appeal," and by forcing him to fall back 
upon a petition for habeas corpus as the means to invoke the Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction, the Repealer Act may have had the effect 
of foreclosing a re-examination of certain issues of fact which, as an 
original proposition, article III commits to the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court subject, however, to exception by Congress: "In all 
the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have ap-
pellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. "79 Even as to 
this, strictly speaking the "exception" to the scope of review would 
arise not by force of the Repealer Act of 1868, but solely by implica-
tion from the Judiciary Act of 1789; insofar as that Act addressed itself 
affirmatively to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the 
scope of that jurisdiction was deemed to be affirmatively limited pursu-
ant to the "exceptions" clause.80 Moreover, where as in McCardle an 
"appeal" might previously have been taken under the appeals section 
of the 1867 Act, but the appeal was itself from a habeas proceeding, 
it is not at all clear that the scope of judicial review would have been 
in any respect broader than that already provided for under section 14 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
The point to be made about McCardle, however, is not the more 
difficult one of determining the knitting and fitting together of other 
cases and other acts of Congress. It is, rather, the simpler point that 
the 1868 Act of Repeal neither was, nor purported on its face to be, 
an exercise of whatever power Congress may (or may not) possess to 
make "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. In-
deed, the constitutional source of the power to repeal a portion of the 
1867 Act creating a special right of "appeal" was presumably simply 
the same source of power previously involved in the enactment of the 
very provision to be repealed. Quite clearly that specification of statu-
tory right was not based to any degree upon the "exceptions" clause 
(especially as the Court stated that the 1867 Act itself did not limit, 
even by implication, any means persons aided by its provisions could 
otherwise use to invoke the Court's appellate jurisdiction); correspond-
79. U.S. CoNST., art. ill (emphasis added). 
80. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810). 
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ingly, neither did its repeal per se. Thus, while the Court committed 
no error in sustaining the constitutionality of the Repealer Act and in 
declining to proceed with McCardle's case under another confirmed stat-
utory heading of its appellate jurisdiction, it may have been in error in 
its ratio decidendi: whatever its true or authentic meaning, the "excep-
tions" power of Congress may not have been involved in Ex parte 
McCardle. 
Measured criticism of Ex parte McCardle is thus to be found not 
in contending that the Supreme Court was necessarily in error in up-
holding the constitutionality of the Repealer Act as applied to a case 
sub judice, or in its decision to decline to proceed to a decision on the 
merits of the case involving the constitutionality of the Military Recon-
struction Act. Rather, it is based on the unguarded suggestion by the 
Court that the case was dismissed for "want of jurisdiction" when, ac-
cording to the Court's own observations, it had adequate jurisdiction 
to proceed but simply declined, under the circumstances, to proceed sua 
sponte on a different jurisdictional basis than that previously relied 
upon by a party in no immediate danger of irreparable harm. And it 
is based, too, on the criticism that the Court treated the Repealer Act 
as though the Act (which was the only statute immediately in con-
troversy before the Court) itself established some "exception" to the 
Court's article ill appellate jurisdiction when in fact the Repealer Act 
evidently created no exception to that jurisdiction and may not have 
been based on that clause at all. Whatever the incidental correctness 
or incorrectness of the Court's discussion of that clause, it is a major 
irony of the case that the entire discussion was quite possibly but an 
advisory opinion of a constitutional clause not essential in disposing of 
the case at hand. 
THE CONTINUITY OF McCardle AND THE EssENTIAL 
CORRECTNESS OF FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
In spite of the foregoing criticisms, it is honestly doubtful whether 
the constitutional significance of Ex parte McCardle is at all dimin-
ished by them or that the case can so simply be dismissed by means 
of an ulterior analysis contending that it was merely a minor deci-
sion involving the unremarkable rescission of a supplementary pro-
cedure briefly made available to a special class of litigants by a year-
old statute. Rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court identified the Re-
pealer Act to the "exceptions" clause of article ill and proceeded to 
address itself directly to the import of that clause. Whatever the factual 
and technical niceties of the Repealer Act (including the fact that it 
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evidently did not withdraw any act of Congress from the possibility 
of constitutional review in the Supreme Court), it is surely more precious 
than useful to conclude that the Court therefore meant to imply that 
it really did not think that the clause was made of real stuff or, rather, 
that the clause really does not cover very much. There is, after all, a 
fairly plain significance that flows easily from the whole opinion, espe-
cially in the larger context of previous and subsequent constructions of 
the clause-a significance little affected, if at all, by the precaution of 
Justice Chase's concluding paragraph that the particular statute in issue 
did not "affect the jurisdiction [of the Court] which was previously 
exercised." 
It is a significance that continued an unwavering line through five 
consecutive Chief Justices including John Marshall who, as Chief Justice 
Chase noted in his reference to Durousseau v. United States, had de-
clared: 
The appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act. 
They are given by the Constitution. But they are limited and reg-
ulated by the judicial act, and by such other acts as have been 
passed on the subject. 
When the first legislature of the Union proceeded to carry 
the third article into effect, they must be understood as intending 
to execute the power they posessed of making exceptions to the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme· Court. . . . 81 
Marshall's statements, moreover, were but an elaboration of his opinion 
delivered 5 years earlier in United States v. More: "As the jurisdiction 
of the court has been described, it has been regulated by congress, and 
an affirmative description of its powers must be understood as a regu-
lation, under the constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers 
than those described."82 This is scarcely different in substance from 
the observation of his predecessor, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, that 
"even the appellate jurisdiction is . . . qualified; inasmuch as it is 
given 'with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as [C]ongress 
shall make.' "83 It is manifest as well, albeit in the different setting 
of original jurisdiction in a federal circuit court, in the reluctant con-
81. Id. at 313-14. Interestingly enough, Marshall had also adverted to the ex-
ceptions clause in the course of the Virginia ratification debates: 
What is the meaning of the term exception? Does it not mean an alteration 
and diminution? Congress is empowered to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme Court. These exceptions 
certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper for the interest and 
liberty of the people. 
3 ELLIOT's DEBATES 560 (2d ed. 1888) (Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788). 
82. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173 (1805) (emphasis added). 
83. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796). 
256 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL, 15 
cession by Mr. Justice Story84 who felt as strongly as anyone on the 
subject: 
The constitution declares, that it is mandatory to the legislature, 
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend [to all 
cases and controversies described in article ill]. That serious 
mischiefs have already arisen, and must continually arise from 
the present very limited jurisdiction of these courts, is most mani-
fest to all those, who are conversant with the administration of 
justice. But we cannot help them. The language of the act is so 
clear, that there is nothing on which to hang a doubt. su 
Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney, in spite of the strongest ex-
pression that any Justice has ever put forward about the essentiality 
of the Supreme Court as "the tribunal which is ultimately to dec;ide 
all judicial questions confided to the Government of the United 
States,"86 had also acknowledged the utter dependency of appellate 
jurisdiction upon acts of Congress: 
By the constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court 
possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred upon 
it by act of Congress; nor can it, when conferred, be exercised in 
any other form, or by any other mode of proceeding, than that 
which the law prescribes. 
. . . And since this court can exercise no appellate power unless it 
is conferred by act of Congress, the writ of error in this case must 
be dismissed. 87 
True, none of these cases involved a particular "exception" which 
Congress had made or implied in reference to what many would think 
of as an "essential" function of the Supreme Court-such as its ulti-
84. See Justice Story's opinion for the Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON Tim CONSTITUTION OF 
'IHB UNITED STATES 449-56 (1833). See also W. CRossKEY, supra note 16. 
85. White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015-16 (No. 17,547) (C.C.D.R.I. 1818), 
See also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 
U.S. 323 (1938); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 
49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 
7 (1799). 
In his commentaries, Mr. Justice Story also observed that while in his view the 
"exceptions" clause requires affirmative action by Congress (rather than exceptions 
by inaction or by implication), it is a broad power: 
. . . It is apparent, then, that the exception was intended as a limitation 
upon the preceding words, to enable congress to regulate and restrain the 
appellate power, as the public interests might, from time to time, require. 
: : : it [the provision of Article m in respect to appellate jurisdiction] leaves 
the power of [C]ongress complete to make exceptions and regulations; but it 
leaves nothing to their inaction. 
J. STORY, supra note 84, at 453, 469. 
86. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). 
87. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119-20 (1847) (footnotes omitted), 
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mate capacity to pass upon the substantive constitutionality of a state 
or federal law, or to render a binding (and uniform) construction of a 
federal law. But this fact may simply attest more to a sense of sound 
congressional opinion against the general wisdom of making such ex-
ceptions than to any impression that it lacked the power to do so--as 
clearly it believed itself sufficiently empowered in disposing of Ex 
parte McCardle, in spite of the fact that the Act it adopted fortuitously 
fell short of its object. Indeed, as such exceptions create the possi-
bility of unresolvable conflicts of interpretation among lower federal 
courts with finality of jurisdiction, or similar conflicts of interpretation 
among state courts with finality of jurisdiction (should Congress also 
oust the lower federal courts), or even of vertical conflicts within a 
single state (depending upon whether the case might originate in either 
a state or federal court, but not be subject to federal court review by 
removal or otherwise), one would scarcely expect such legislation rou-
tinely to issue from Congress. In no opinion by the Supreme Court 
touching upon the subject, however, is there any express or implied 
suggestion that the power to "except'' is limited to making "inessential" 
exceptions. 88 Nor does the final paragraph in Ex parte McCardle 
fairly express such a thought. 
Rather, Ex parte McCardle, far more than was true of Marbury v. 
Madison, was not written on a clean slate. Basically, the same Supreme 
Court had observed only 4 years earlier: 
The original jurisdiction of this court, and its power to re-
ceive appellate jurisdiction, are created and defined by the Con-
stitution; and the legislative department of the government can 
enlarge neither one nor the other. But it is for Congress to deter-
mine how far, within the limits of the capacity of this court to take, 
appellate jurisdiction shall be given, and when conferred, it can 
be exercised only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by 
law. In these respects it is wholly the creature of legislation.89 
Only a dozen years after McCardle, moreover, Chief Justice Waite went 
even further in behalf of an equally unanimous Court by stating, "[n]ot 
only may whole classes of cases be kept out of the jurisdiction alto-
gether, but particular classes of questions may be subjected to re-ex-
amination and review, while others are not."90 Even for some of the 
exceedingly thoughtful critics who would qualify this view, at least so 
88. But see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 589-606 (1962) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting, which might be read this way); (cf. note 58, supra) Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 324-37 (1796) (Wilson, J., dissenting in part). 
89. Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865) (footnotes 
omitted). 
90. The ''Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1881). 
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far as the selective removal of constitutional issues might be involved 
by a "regulation" or "exception" otherwise confirming appellate juris-
diction, 91 the general scope of the exceptions clause has been regarded 
as settled by McCardle. Thus, dissenting on other issues in Yakus v. 
United States, Mr. Justice Rutledge nevertheless observed by way of 
introduction that "[C]ongress has plenary power to confer or withhold 
appellate jurisdiction, cf. Ex parte McCardle. . . ."02 Similarly, in 
the view of Mr. Justice Frankfurter: 
Congress need not establish inferior courts; Congress need not grant 
the full scope of jurisdiction which it is empowered to vest in 
them; Congress need not give this Court any appellate power; it may 
withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it may do so 
even while a case is sub judice. Ex parte McCardle . . . 03 
These impressions do, after all, seem to be by far the more nat-
ural understanding of the entire McCardle opinion. Understood in this 
unstrained manner, certain portions of the opinion that might other-
wise seem puzzling and self-abnegating yield a firm and consistent un-
derstanding that the congressional power is plenary, even as Mr. Justice 
Rutledge understood it to be. Specifically, the McCardle Court went 
out of its way to observe: "We are not at liberty to inquire into the 
motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under 
the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate 
jurisdiction of this court is given by express words."94 Read as imply-
ing that the Court must somehow bow to an "exception" even when 
frank assessment of the legislative record readily demonstrates that the 
particular statute is not an authorized exception, this passage seems 
odd and artificially self-stultifying of the Court's capacity to decide 
real cases. Thus, it would seem at once to say that perhaps the con-
gressional power to "except" from the appellate jurisdiction is limited 
to certain minimum uses originally discussed in the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787 and in the process of ratification;9u but that, even so, 
91. If given the power to decide at all, the Courts must, consistent with the oath 
of office provided in article VI, be free to decide in favor of the Constitution. See 
Yal..'Us v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 472 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Hart, 
supra note 16, at 1402 ("[J]urisdiction always is jurisdiction only to decide consti-
tutionally"). See also United States v. Klein, SO U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872}, and 
discussion in text accompanying note 114 infra. 
92. 321 U.S. 414, 472-73 (1944) (emphasis added). 
93. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949) 
(dissenting opinion). 
94. 74 U.S. at 514. 
95. It has been argued, for example, that Congress has the power to "except" only 
findings of fact determined by a jury. See R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 286-89; 
Merry, supra note 16. But see J. GOEBEL, supra note 16, at 240, 247; and Strong, 
supra note 16. It has been contended that exceptions can be made of certain "cases" 
enumerated in article ill, but not of any of the "questions" which the enumerated 
"cases" comprehend. W. CRossKEY, supra note 16, at 617-18. Others have suggested, 
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the Court must wear blinders and decline to consider the validity of a 
given use as not within that intention even when the evidence may be 
readily ascertainable and superabundant (as, arguably, it was in the 
legislative record of the Repealer Act itself). 
But this reading of the Court's dictum seems entirely too strained. 
Taken exactly at face value, the statement declares that the manner in 
which Congress may presume to use its exceptions power in article III 
is simply no more subject to constitutional objection than the manner 
in which it presumes to use any of its other powers as granted by the 
Constitution. For instance, the unwillingness of the Court to question 
the use of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce in de-
termining whether a given statute is authorized by article I, section 8, 
is well established-it is not perceived at all as an instance of putting 
on judicial blinders or of abdicating the duty of constitutional review. 
Rather, the Court has already held, in the course of providing sub-
stantive constitutional review, that the commerce clause commits to 
Congress a plenary authority over the subject matter of the clause. 
The power to regulate interstate commerce is simply the power "to pre-
scribe the rule by which [that] commerce is to be governed."96 Ac-
cordingly, Congress may "regulate" that commerce whether or not the 
effect of such regulation is to diminish (rather than to enhance) its 
free circulation, and whether or not the palpable objective of the regu-
lation has little or nothing in common with any particular use that some 
however, that exceptions can more generally be made so long as they do not affect the 
hard core of the national judicial power and are not incompatible with the "essential 
constitutional functions of the Court." Ratner, supra note 16, at 168-73. Possibly, 
"exceptions" may be made with respect to various modes of review, but only so far as 
an "irreducible minimum" of appellate jurisdiction is retained adequate to resolve 
"inconsistent or conflicting federal or state judicial interpretations of federal law, and to 
uphold the supremacy of federal law over the states in any conflict with state law or 
authority," and to bring within protective reach of the Court "a citizen's total personal 
constitutional rights." Forkosch, supra note 16, at 256-57. Still again, an exception 
might be made of certain cases otherwise within the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court by relocating that jurisdiction "at the lower level of judicial admin-
istration," in one or more inferior federal courts. J. GOEBEL, supra note 16, at 247. 
Still another possibility is to suggest that Congress may "except" from the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction only to insure greater attention to a given case by 
requiring that it be considered as matter of original jurisdiction, with the result that 
all of "the judicial power of the United States shall vest in one Supreme Court." 
But unfortunately, the entire history of the clause does not support this interpretation. 
A final possibility would have been to regard article ill as wholly self-executing 
once the Supreme Court was established with the Court itself initially the master of 
the occasions for the use of its own judicial power--exactly as articles I and II vest 
certain powers in Congress and the President but do not on that account establish 
any enforceable claims to their particular exercise. Then, reading the "exceptions 
and regulations" clause as a positive check against the possibility of judicial self-ab-
negation or refusal to exercise the judicial power, the power to "except" and to "regu-
late" might mean merely that Congress could require the exercise of the judicial power 
by statute in instances where it disagreed with the Court's refusal to exercise power. 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). But again, the whole 
history of the clause is against this idea. 
96. Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). 
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may originally have imagined in contemplation of providing for that 
power. 97 It may, of course, always be a matter of interest to know 
what the Founders believed to require the inclusion of a given power 
among the enumerated powers of Congress, but that is scarcely dis-
positive of the different question respecting the breadth of the power 
thus given. The "best" or the "wisest" ends that the Founders may have 
believed impossible to secure without including the commerce power 
may well explain why the power was provided; they were not, how-
ever, simultaneously enacted into the Constitution as positive law re-
strictions upon its possible use. 98 That there may be (and are) restric-
tions lying outside the clause, and that these may be of the utmost 
importance and effect (such as the Bill of Rights or article I, section 9), 
is certainly not to be denied in determining whether a statute, valid in-
sofar as authorized by the commerce clause, is nonetheless unconstitu-
tional because of some other consideration. But that, of course, is 
quite a different matter. 
On balance, there seems to be little reason to depart from this 
same approach in respect to the exceptions clause, even as suggested 
by Justice Rutledge in Yakus and as declared rather plainly by the 
Court in McCardle, echoing five generations of Supreme Court state-
ments on the subject.. The power to make exceptions to Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction is a plenary power. It is given in express 
terms and without limitation, regardless of the more modest uses that 
might have been anticipated and, hopefully, generally to be respected 
by Congress as a matter of enlightened policy once the power was 
granted, as it was, to the fullest extent. In short, the clause is complete 
exactly as it stands: the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
is subject to "such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make." 
This view of the matter is by no means disrespectful of scholarly 
inquiries into the possible interests of the Founders in an exceptions 
clause, and indeed there is nothing explicit in those inquiries which in-
97. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); 
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 
188 U.S. 321 (1903). See also Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Fed· 
eralization of Intrastate Crime, 15 A.ruz. L. REv.- (1973). 
98. Chief Justice Marshall went on to say in Gibbons v. Ogden: 
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may 
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than 
are prescribed in the constitution . . . . The wisdom and the discretion of 
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their con-
stituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, 
for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, 
to secure them from its abuse. 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97. 
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exorably supports a different or more limited view of the clause. 
Rather, they tend to show only that certain uses of the clause were 
readily anticipated (and at once put into effect in the Judiciary Act of 
1789), even without purporting to exhaust the power. For example, 
some (perhaps most) evidently believed it to be a useful clause prin-
cipally as a means of safeguarding the finality of jury verdicts in regard 
to primary adjudicative facts: of safeguarding the right to trial by jury 
insofar as article ill itself would authorize de novo redeterminations of 
fact in the Supreme Court were no "exception" made by Congress. 99 
Others evidently saw additional utility at least in keeping from the Court 
innumerable civil claims arising in the inferior courts but involving 
amounts in controversy too small to warrant appellate jurisdiction in 
the Supreme Court, especially since the physical inaccessibility of the 
Court might make such appeal of skewed advantage to a given class 
of litigants.100 Both of these views are well reflected in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789.101 It is clear, moreover, that pursuant to that Act cer-
tain cases plainly within "the judicial power of the United States" as 
described in article ill did not vest in any federal court, whether origi-
nally, by removal or by any other mode of appellate review.102 In-
deed, even federal question jurisdiction (committed for purposes of 
original jurisdiction almost exclusively to the state courts for the first 
century following the adoption of the Constitution) could come within 
the "appellate jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court only under specified 
99. Professor Goebel points out that the exceptions and regulations clause "was not 
debated" in the Constitutional Convention, and suggests in passing that "in con-
temporary state practice, regulation had been confined largely to such details as set-
ting appealable minima or periods of limitation, and 'exceptions' of certain proceed-
ings where neither a writ of error nor certiorari had been traditionally available." 
J. GoEBEL, supra note 16, at 240. Subsequently, when the proposed Constitution 
came under attack partly on the basis that the provision for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over matters of fact as well as law threatened the "right" to trial by jury, 
the exceptions clause was adverted to as one means of allaying that anxiety. See 
Merry, supra note 16. The references, however, scarcely go so far as to suggest that 
that is all the clause would reach. See, for instance, Marshall's statement in the 
Virginia Convention, supra note 81. Similarly, speaking to the same issue, Governor 
Randolph hardly limited the potential reach of the clause to such matters when, with 
specific reference to the exceptions clause, he observed: "It would be proper to refer 
here to any thing that could be understood in the federal court. They [Congress] 
may except generally both as to law and fact, or they may except as to the law only, 
or fact only." III ELUOT's DEBATES 572 (2d ed. 1888) (Virginia Convention, June 21, 
1788). 
100. See Warren, supra note 16. 
101. For example, provision was made for cases within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court for jury trial of issues of fact, and the Court's appellate jurisdiction 
was generally confined to writs of error. Diversity appellate jurisdiction in the Su-
preme Court was limited to claims exceeding $2,000, and diversity jurisdiction was 
limited in the lower courts to exclude creditor-assignees. 
102. For example, diversity cases involving less than $500 could not originate in 
any federal court nor be removed to such a court and a fortiori could not come 
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by that route. To the extent 
that such cases originated only in state courts and failed to raise any federal question, 
neither could they reach the Supreme Court by that route. 
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circumstances far short of the complete authorization in article ill that 
"all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution [or] the laws of the 
United States" might come within that appellate jurisdiction had Con· 
gress not made exceptions. Thus, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
state court interpretations of federal statutes and the Constitution were 
made unreviewable by the Supreme Court as a general matter, assum· 
ing only that the interpretation of the state court favored, rather than 
disfavored, the party relying on that source of authority. In these and 
a variety of other ways, 103 "exceptions" were made that may or may 
not have altogether harmonized with the personal desires of each indi· 
vidual voting for the "exceptions" clause anticipating its practical use 
for only one or two purposes, but who nonetheless approved it in its 
more general form. 
Accordingly, in this light the Supreme Court was speaking neither 
disingenuously nor thoughtlessly when it said, as it did in McCardle, 
that it was not at liberty to inquire into the motives of Congress, but 
rather was restricted to examining the express power of Congress under 
the Constitution to make exceptions. At the same time, with all of 
the thorough scholarship that has sifted through the very slight debates 
originally attending the exceptions clause, no single and unequivocal 
utterance has been discovered sufficient to raise a serious question 
about this matter. It may be true that the lack of attention received 
by the clause was in significant measure due to the dimness of recogni· 
tion respecting the judicial power of substantive constitutional review. 
It is also possible that the review power sprang full blown neither from 
settled provisions or settled understandings of the proposed Constitu· 
tion nor, indeed, even from the pen of John Marshall with the relatively 
early decision in Marbury v. Madison. It does, however, appear to be 
more than a passingly strange argument to suggest that because the 
full evolution of substantive constitutional review may itself have been 
exogenous to the Constitution, the power of Congress to make excep· 
tion of any appellate jurisdiction described in article III therefore does 
not extend to such review; as though the power to make exceptions 
applies to any appellate jurisdiction granted by article ill, but not to 
that judicial power which the Supreme Court simply evolved in the full· 
103. For example, federal criminal cases were committed exclusively to the lower 
federal courts, with no provision for review in the Supreme Court by appeal or writ 
of error. While recourse to the Court's appellate jurisdiction was provided by means 
of habeas corpus (and some measure of review was possible upon certification of 
questions by the lower courts), the means thus provided fell short of confirming the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction in respect to all cases arising under the laws of the 
United States because habeas corpus would not reach all such cases. See Ratner, supra 
note 16, at 195-201. 
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ness of time.104 
Finally, however, no more than is true of the commerce power 
or any other power of Congress, does any of this imply an absence of 
constitutional limitations lying outside the exceptions clause but still 
fully applicable to its every use. Without doubt, the Bill of Rights 
applies as do the several limitations flowing from article I, section 9.105 
To exclude from review the claims of a readily identifiable group de-
termined by the Court to have been disfavored by Congress as a device 
of legislative punishment, for instance, might be held to offend the ban 
on bills of attainder.106 An "exception" precluding redetermination in 
the Supreme Court of an alleged "fact" of obscenity when the Court 
regards the matter as one of "constitutional" fact might be held not to 
state an instance of excepting a case from appellate jurisdiction, but of 
impermissibly foreshortening the decisional process in a manner the 
Court would feel obliged to disregard in light of the first amendment. 
An exception to the scope of review applicable only in cases where the 
defendant availed himself of his right to trial by jury, but not when 
he agreed to a bench trial, moreover, might be held to offend the sixth 
or fourteenth amendments' protections of the right to trial by jury.107 
Perhaps the simplest illustration would be an "exception" of cases based 
upon the appellant's race: an exception certain to be held offensive 
to the fifth amendment's dimension of equal protection.108 Expanding 
upon this example, one may plausibly argue that whatever basis of 
classification for excepting certain cases from the Court's appellate juris-
diction Congress may have used, it is necessarily subject to review to 
determine whether the class thus described is "arbitrary" or "invidious" 
in the sense condemned by whatever standards of equal protection ap-
104. Cf. Strong, supra note 16. 
105. Consider also the possibility that the exceptions clause might not apply in re-
spect to the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," suspension of which is spe-
cifically forbidden by article I, section 9 (except under the extraordinary circum-
stances mentioned in that provision). Recent study suggests that "the Constitution's 
habeas corpus clause is a directive to all superior courts of record, state as well as 
federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely available," that, notwithstanding Mar-
shall's opinion in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), the power of the 
Supreme Court to issue the writ arises within its original jurisdiction (which is not 
subject to the exceptions clause) by force of the habeas clause, that its use is not con-
tingent upon any confirming act of Congress, and that "[i]ts use by courts caunot 
... be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress." Johnson v. Eisentra-
ger, 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). See Paschal, supra note 16. 
106. Cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Cummings v. Missouri, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). 
107. See Comment, Removal of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: A Weapon 
Against Obscenity?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 291; cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 
(1i8:!· This intriguing possibility I first heard suggested years ago by Mr. Lawrence 
Wallace (formerly of the Duke faculty and currently with the Office of Solicitor 
General). 
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propriately applies to the subject matter.109 
Where the class of excluded cases involves the exercise of "fun-
damental rights," the appropriate standard of judicial review is the 
more taxing one which denies any presumption of constitutionality and 
requires that the government justify the exceptional treatment of the 
class by demonstrating an imperative connection between the basis for 
singling out that class and a highly compelling, as well as licit, govern-
mental interest. Arguably, this standard of fifth amendment equal 
protection review would be applicable to cases "excepted" from the ap-
pellate jurisdiction involving criminal convictions under anti-obscenity 
statutes punishing varieties of speech or expression claimed to be pro-
tected by the first amendment-as simply one illustration of a class 
of cases involving "fundamental" rights. 
Accordingly, the class of cases thus "excepted" by Congress should 
be sustained if (but only if) the government can articulate an impera-
tive connection between that class of cases and a reason for excepting 
that class which is both licit and compelling. Plainly, considerations 
of alleged "judicial economy'' or similar makeweights ought not be 
enough in respect to such cases, and the question must inevitably arise 
whether the most obvious reason would be deemed either licit or com-
pelling by the Court: that Congress excepted that particular class of 
cases precisely because it was dissatisfied with the manner in which the 
Supreme Court had been deciding them in the exercise of its power of 
substantive constitutional review. Exactly at this juncture, the Court 
might again find itself involved in an additional investigation of the 
functions of the exceptions clause itself, but this time in a different 
way in order to resolve the fifth amendment objection to the manner 
in which Congress exercised its power. 
If the exceptions clause meant to permit Congress to "check" the 
Court specifically in the exercise of substantive constitutional review, 
then the categorical exception of any group of cases made by Congress 
for that very reason cannot possibly be deemed offensive to the fifth 
amendment's equal protection concern: the exceptions clause itself 
would provide the source for the government's argument that that rea-
son is both licit and compelling enough. If the clause is not seen as 
approving such a use of the exceptions power, on the other hand, 
it is difficult to imagine any other basis sufficient for the purpose. 
At this point, therefore, one's interest in the original understanding of 
the functions of the exceptions clause takes on a very different impor-
109. See generally Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 Aruz. 
L. REv. 479 (1973). 
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tance: not to determine what kinds of "exceptions" Congress may 
make under the clause without reference to the fifth amendment, but 
what kinds of exceptions Congress may make given the subsequent 
ratification of the fifth amendment and its requirement of equal 
protection? Correspondingly, there is no embarrassment if the answer 
that now emerges may be a different answer than the Court provided 
in Ex parte McCardle, which was decided long before judicial doctrine 
had evolved in this aspect of the fifth amendment. Specifically, the 
fact that consideration of the "exceptions" clause was apparently very 
casual, and that the examples of its appropriate use never involved 
any suggestion that it meant to provide a check against felt excesses of 
the Court in the exercise of substantive constitutional review, and the 
absence of expressed concern that Congress needed a means of curbing 
that review (except as to findings of fact), all may be useful to show 
that such a use is not made a licit and compelling reason by the clause 
itself. Thus, the use by Congress of the exceptions power to single 
out a class of cases involving fundamental rights, withdrawn from the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction only from dissatisfaction with 
the Court's exercise of its power of substantive constitutional review 
in respect to such cases, may, ironically, today be subject to fifth 
amendment challenge. On the other hand, a bill adopted from mo-
tives of retaliation against the Supreme Court would not necessarily 
betray that purpose on its face and might enable the government to 
argue that consistent with the face of the bill, it may have been the 
purpose of Congress simply to leave finality of decision with state 
courts-a purpose that does find some substantial measure of support 
in the origins of the exceptions clause and the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
Nothing in the plenitude of the exceptions clause itself, more-
over, nor in combination with any other provision in article ill, im-
plies that Congress could fashion a law enabling the government to 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process; 
that is, without a fair opportunity to test any nonfrivolous objection to 
the government's action in an adversary adjudicative forum, including 
any substantive constitutional objections.110 Every case sustaining the 
110. See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
335 U.S. 887 (1948). The case upheld an act of Congress barring a certain class of 
claims from any court, federal, state or territorial, but only under circumstances where 
the court had already determined: (a) that such claims were entirely the product of a 
federal statute; (b) Congress had ample authority to abolish such claims; (c) Con-
gress had in fact abolished them; and (d) the substantive elimination of the claims 
did not deprive the claimants of substantive due process. As an added precaution, the 
Court observed: 
We think, however, that the exercise by Congress of its control over juris-
diction is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the 
[f]ifth [a]mendment. That is to say, while Congress has the undoubted power 
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power of Congress to forbid the adjudication of a federal question by 
the state judiciary has been at pains to note that in such circumstances 
another forum had been provided which the Court deemed sufficient 
in respect to procedural due process.111 Similarly, while plenary con-
gressional authority over the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, when 
combined with plenary congressional power to make exception to the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, may provide a possible 
means to oust certain cases entirely from the federal judiciary, the 
residual constitutional obligation of state judges "to support this Con-
stitution" would then be drawn into play, exactly as Henry Hart quite 
properly observed.112 
But the point is not to exhaust the myriad ways in which the Bill 
of Rights or other parts of the Constitution function as a set of affirma-
tive restrictions upon the exceptions power or upon any other power 
of Congress. Nor is it to suggest a sense of complacency that such 
safeguards are necessarily sufficient as a substitute for additional re-
strictions that some might prefer to add by amending the exceptions 
clause itsel£.113 To the contrary, it is only to indicate again that indeed 
they lie outside the clause. 
As suggested by one of the preceding illustrations, however, it may 
happen that what Congress would claim to be a statute enacting an 
"exception" does not in fact except the case from the Courfs appellate 
jurisdiction at all, but rather leaves it within that jurisdiction while at-
tempting to dictate the outcome of a constitutional decision. In such 
a case, the statute may fail simply for want of power to adopt it, 114 
or as an unpermitted corruption of the judicial power to decide the case 
to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme 
Court [in respect to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction], it must not so 
exercise that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law or to take private property without just compensa-
tion •... 
Thus, regardless of whether subdivision (d) of section 2 [which removed jurisdiction of the claims from all courts] had an independent end in itself, 
if one of its effects would be to deprive the appellants of property without 
due process or just compensation, it would be invalid. 
Id. at 257 (footnotes omitted). 
What the Supreme Court may deem sufficient to satisfy the fifth amendment 
requirement of procedural due process is, of course, a separate question. Occasion-
ally, it has taken vezy little indeed. See, e.g., Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. 
No. 7, 405 U.S. 365 (1972); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Falbo v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Imp. 
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). 
111. Sr;e Yal'US v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
112. See Hart, supra note 16, at 1401. 
113. See Roberts, supra note 16. 
114. Congress is nowhere authorized to adopt laws interpreting the Constitution 
and binding upon the courts in respect to that interpretation. The claim of such a 
power is in no sense a lesser-included power of that to make "exceptions" to and 
"regulations" of jurisdiction. This much is settled by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803 ). 
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consistent with the Constitution, 115 or both. Indeed, even a statute 
wholly ousting a case from further consideration by the Court, but only 
after the decisional process had gone forward to determine a particular 
matter of fact, was rejected by the Supreme CourtY6 It may also hap-
pen that a case is not excepted and substantive rules of decision are 
not imposed contrary to the Constitution, but that an attempt is made 
to regulate the Court by restricting the remedy identified to the very 
substance of the constitutional right itself. In such an instance, the 
Court might appropriately determine whether the improper limitation 
upon its decisional power is severable from the statute otherwise con-
firming its appellate jurisdiction and simply proceed as it believes to be 
required, or whether the remedial limitation is so integral to the statute 
that it must decline to proceed with the case at all, as in instances 
where Congress has sought advisory opinions.117 It is at these frontiers 
that sharp questions must continue to arise with sharp practices. 
CoNCLUSION 
There are several very substantial limitations upon the power of 
Congress to curb or to control the Supreme Court.118 First, as Con-
gress may not overrule or reverse a decision of that Court on any mat-
ter involving an interpretation of the Constitution, neither may it seek 
to direct the outcome of constitutional adjudication by legislating a rule 
of decision which, if applied_, would produce a judgment that the Con-
stitution forbids. Nor may Congress accomplish that result by legis-
lating the selective removal of constitutional questions while other-
115. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 472-73 (1944) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting) ("While Congress has plenary power to confer .or withhold appellate juris-
diction, cf, Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, it has not so far been held, and it does 
not follow, that Congress can confer it, yet deny the appellate court power to con-
sider constitutional questions relating to the law in issue"); accord, Payne v. Griffin, 
51 F. Supp. 588, 591 (M.D. Ga. 1943): 
If Congress prohibits an inferior court from trying a case, the court cannot 
entertain it and, if Congress confers jurisdiction to try a case, the court 
cannot refuse to accept jurisdiction . . . . But, having directed the court to 
try the case, Congress has no authority also to direct the court to render 
judgment in accordance with the terms of a void act in disregard of the su-
preme law of the land. The distinction is that, while Congress can deter-
mine what cases a court can try, it cannot direct what law shall control 
the decision. 
See also Hart, supra note 16, at 1402. 
116. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
117. See, e.g., cases and references collected in Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 
346, 352-60 (1911). An illustration of this problem may well have been present in 
one or another of the proposed anti-busing bills urged upon Congress by the President 
in the summer of 1972. See text of note 14 supra. See also Hearings on H.R. 
13916 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1972). 
118. .Consistent with these limitations, it is frankly doubtful whether any of the 
bill referred to in the text accompanying notes 9-14 supra, would have survived 
constitutional challenge. 
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wise providing that an affirmative decision shall issue on the merits 
of the case. Nor may it so drastically restrict the character of any 
remedy which the Court would otherwise be free to provide that the 
result in a particular case would involve the Court in an affirmative de-
nial of a constitutional right or in the affirmative application of an un-
constitutional law. None of these devices is a ''lesser-included" power 
of the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court. Rather, each involves a different claim to power no-
where granted to Congress: to press the processes of the Court into 
service as an active agent of government action inconsistent with a valid 
constitutional claim. Viewed as a "regulation" of the Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction (rather than as an "exception"), moreover, each 
device should fail for the reason that the power to decide at all must 
include the power to decide according to the Constitution, consistent 
with the judicial duty and oath of office to support that Constitution.110 
Second, such "exceptions" as Congress shall deem necessary and 
proper to make within its authorized power are nonetheless fully sub-
ject to review under article I, section 9, the Bill of Rights and other 
constitutional provisions uniformly applicable to all acts of Congress. 
Granted that the power to except is as plenary as the power to regu-
late commerce among the several states, for instance, there is no reason 
to suppose that it is less subject to the first or the fifth amendments 
than would be true of a regulation of commerce.120 
Third, even in combination with all other powers of Congress, the 
power to make exceptions of certain cases in the Supreme Court does 
not mean that Congress may act to deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law. Due process does not require 
either a hearing or an appeal in the Supreme Court. It does require, 
however, at least one fair hearing in a judicial setting which, in light 
of the claim that is asserted, conforms to the Supreme Court's stated 
requisites of procedural due process. Presumably, Congress may re-
serve certain claims to particular inferior federal courts, or innovate 
119. This is not to deny, however, that constitutional questions may be reserved to 
some special proceeding. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
120. While the question is less free from doubt given the heavy weight of judicial 
precedent as against the apparent plain meaning of the clause plus recent scholarly 
research, it is arguable that the habeas corpus clause of article I, section 9, lies beyond 
the power of Congress to make exceptions to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
If the suggestion is correct that the power to issue that writ runs directly to the 
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction (rather than to its appellate jurisdiction), the 
exceptions clause does not even purport to reach it. Even assuming that the "privi-
lege of the writ" is in whole or in part a function of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 
it remains arguable that its independent provision in the Constitution states a positive 
exception, limiting the authority to suspend it to the particular circumstances stated in 
the clause: "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it." 
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other federal courts, and deny review in the Supreme Court pursuant 
to the exceptions clause. Alternatively, it may fail to vest original juris-
diction in any inferior federal court and except to any appellate juris-
diction by the Supreme Court. In that event, however, the residual 
obligation of the state judiciary to provide a forum consistent with pro-
cedural due process would be triggered. Correspondingly, the omis-
sion of any state forum under the circumstances would be subject to 
successful challenge as a denial of procedural due process. 
In addition to these considerations, the general inexpediency of a 
headless inferior federal judiciary or an array of final state courts-
brought about by lopping off the means of reconciling conflicting in-
terpretations of national law and of the Constitution short of the Su-
preme Court-must not be discounted as a major restraining influence 
upon the practical use of the exceptions clause. As to this, however, 
Ex parte McCardle does provide an instance when Congress once be-
lieved that it would prefer that course, and there is ultimately very lit-
tle on which to stand in disagreement with those who decline to cavil 
with its meaning. As Professor Wechsler put the matter less than a 
decade ago: 
I see no basis for this view [that the exceptions clause has a narrow 
meaning, not including cases of constitutional dimension] and think 
it antithetical to the plan of the Constitution for the courts-which 
was quite simply that the Congress would decide from time to time 
how far the federal judicial institution should be used within the 
limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated differently, how far 
judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state courts, bound as they 
are by the Constitution as the supreme Law of the Land . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.121 
This does appear to be the most accurate statement of the matter. Con-
sistent with the plan, and subject to the limitations reviewed/22 Con-
gress may make exception to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court even of cases of constitutional significance. By reposing finality 
of such decisions in a number of other courts, it might thereby give 
the Constitution a number of different heads on the order of the mythi-
cal Hydra, however peculiar we might think the result to be in the 
dimming twilight of federalism. 
121. Wechsler, supra note 16, at 1005-06. 
122. See especially text and footnote discussion at note 106 supra. 
